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Abstract 
Majority cycling and related social choice paradoxes are often thought to threaten the meaningful-
ness of democracy. Deliberation can protect against majority cycles—not by inducing unanimity, 
which is unrealistic, but by bringing preferences closer to single-peakedness. We present the first 
empirical test of this hypothesis, using data from Deliberative Polls. Comparing preferences before 
and after deliberation, we find increases in proximity to single-peakedness. The increases are 
greater for lower- versus higher-salience issues and for individuals who seem to have deliberated 
more versus less effectively. They are not merely a by-product of increased substantive agreement 
(which in fact does not generally increase). Our results are important, quite apart from their implica-
tions for majority cycling, because single-peakedness can be naturally interpreted in terms of an un-
derlying issue dimension, which can both clarify the debate and allow a majority-winning alterna-
tive to be interpreted as a median choice and thus as an attractive “compromise.” 
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Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: 
Evidence from Deliberative Polls 
Condorcet’s and similar paradoxes of social choice have long been seen as serious problems for 
democracy. Condorcet showed that pairwise majority voting in decisions over three or more alterna-
tives can lead to cyclical majority preferences. If a third of a group (electorate, committee, etc.) pre-
fers x to y to z, another third prefers y to z to x, and the remaining third prefers z to x to y, majorities 
prefer x to y, y to z, and yet z to x. This illustrates at least three problems with majority rule. First, 
rational (i.e., transitive and complete) individual preferences may lead to irrational (specifically, 
cyclical) majority preferences (collective irrationality). Second, pairwise majority voting may fail to 
produce a stable winning outcome (instability). Third, when pairwise majority votes are taken se-
quentially, the outcome may depend on the order in which the votes are taken and may thus be ma-
nipulable by agenda setters (path dependence, leading to agenda manipulability). Arrow’s theorem 
(1951/1963) shows that these and related problems generalize well beyond majority rule,1 and Riker 
(1982) has influentially argued that they undermine the meaningfulness of democracy.2 
What may be said against such counsel of despair? A number of authors have recently argued 
that majority cycles are empirically rare (Miller 2000, List and Goodin 2001, Tsetlin, Regenwetter, 
and Grofman 2003, Mackie 2004, Regenwetter et al. 2006). That may well be (the literature as a 
whole has not yet conceded the point), but we should still wish to understand why they are not more 
frequent, and what helps minimize their frequency. In this light, it is useful to show the existence of 
realizable conditions under which democratic institutions can robustly protect against cycles, where 
“robust protection” means the prevention of cycles for a large class of actual and counterfactual cir-
cumstances. It is well known that majority cycles are precluded if individual preferences are “sin-
gle-peaked,” in the original, ordinal sense defined by Black (1948) and Arrow (1951/1963). This 
requires the existence of a left-right ordering of the alternatives such that each individual has (1) a 
most preferred alternative and (2) a decreasing preference for other alternatives as they get more 
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distant in either direction from it. The median individual’s most preferred alternative then prevails. 
Here we examine the possibility that deliberation can offer robust protection against cycles by mov-
ing preferences toward single-peakedness (as suggested by Miller 1992, Knight and Johnson 1994, 
Dryzek and List 2003; less explicitly, the idea goes back to Arrow 1951/1963, ch. VII). 
Deliberation’s effect on the extent to which preferences are single-peaked is important, quite 
apart from its implications for majority cycling. Single-peakedness stands out among structure con-
ditions for the avoidance of majority cycles.3 It can be naturally interpreted in terms of an underly-
ing issue dimension and be the result of a form of “meta-agreement” (List 2002)—agreement not 
about the preference ordering of alternatives but about a dimension on which the alternatives can be 
arrayed. This can both clarify the debate and allow a majority-winning alternative to be interpreted 
as the choice of the median voter on the agreed dimension and thus as an attractive “compromise.” 
Further, single-peakedness is sufficient not only for the absence of cycles but for the possibility of 
strategy-proof collective decision making (Moulin 1980).4  
In sizeable populations, single-peakedness—a binary property that is either satisfied or violated 
by any given combination of preferences across individuals—may be hard to attain. Niemi (1969) 
and List (2001) have therefore suggested measuring proximity to single-peakedness, defined for-
mally below. As proximity to single-peakedness increases, the probability of majority cycles de-
creases (see Niemi 1969, Feld and Grofman 1986, Gehrlein 2004, and our results). But does delib-
eration actually increase proximity to single-peakedness? And, if so, when and how? 
This paper presents the first empirical study of these questions. We focus on deliberation in mass 
publics, using data from Deliberative Polls, which examine deliberation’s effects on preferences 
and other variables (for overviews, see Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002, Fishkin and Luskin 2005, 
or Fishkin 2009; on legislative or jury deliberation, see Steiner et al. 2005, Mendelberg 2002). The 
basic design involves interviewing a good-quality random sample; gathering its members for a 
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weekend to deliberate in randomly assigned small groups; allowing them to put questions arising 
from the small group discussions to panels of competing policy experts and policy makers; and rein-
terviewing them at the end.5 
Our central analysis compares measures of proximity to single-peakedness before and after de-
liberation. We also advance, and examine the evidence for, some hypotheses about when and for 
whom proximity to single-peakedness increases most. We contrast the results for high- versus low- 
to moderate-salience issues, for cases in which there is a more versus less natural left-right ordering 
of the alternatives, and for participants who seem to have learnt and thought more versus less, judg-
ing from the observed knowledge they emerge with. Our results support and refine the hypothesis 
that deliberation brings preferences closer to single-peakedness.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Individual and Collective Preferences 
Consider a set N = {1, 2, …, n} of individuals (voters, committee members, etc.) and a set X = {x, y, 
z, …} of alternatives (policies, candidates, etc.). Each individual i has a preference ordering Ri over 
X, where, for any x, y∈X, xRiy means that individual i weakly prefers x to y. When xRiy but not yRix, 
we write xPiy (“individual i strictly prefers x to y”). Ri is rational if it is complete (for all x, y∈X, 
xRiy or yRiz) and transitive (for all x, y, z∈X, if xRiy and yRiz, then xRiz).  
An aggregation rule maps a profile of individual preference orderings (R1, R2, …, Rn), hereafter 
(Ri)i∈N, to a collective preference ordering R, defined as in the individual case. In pairwise majority 
voting, for each (Ri)i∈N, R is defined as follows: for any x,y∈X, xRy if and only if there are as many 
or more individuals with xRiy as with yRix. A Condorcet winner is an alternative that is weakly ma-
jority-preferred to every other. Condorcet’s paradox shows that, for some profiles of rational indi-
vidual preference orderings, the majority preference ordering is irrational—specifically, cyclical 
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and thus intransitive. If the cycle is at the top of the ordering (no non-cycling alternative is majority-
preferred to every cycling alternative), there is no Condorcet winner. 
How likely Condorcet’s paradox is to occur depends on how individual preferences are statisti-
cally distributed. If all logically possible preference orderings are equiprobable (an “impartial cul-
ture”), the probability of a cycle increases with both the number of individuals n and the number of 
alternatives k (Gehrlein 1983). For other, non-equiprobable distributions, which may be empirically 
more realistic, however, the probability of cycles can be much lower (List and Goodin 2001, appen-
dix 3; Tsetlin, Regenwetter, and Grofman 2003; Regenwetter et al. 2006).  
 
Single-Peakedness 
Consider an ordering (as distinct from preference ordering) Ω of the alternatives from left to right, 
with “left” and “right” understood in a purely geometric sense. An individual i’s preference order-
ing Ri is single-peaked with respect to Ω if i has a most preferred alternative and a decreasing pref-
erence for other alternatives as they get more distant in either direction (relative to Ω) from it.6 For 
example, the individual preference orderings (x, y, z), (z, y, x), (y, x, z), and (y, z, x) (each listed in 
strictly decreasing order of preference) are single-peaked with respect to the left-to-right ordering 
Ω=[x y z]. By contrast, the preference orderings (x, z, y) and (z, x, y) are not single-peaked with re-
spect to Ω = [x y z]. 
Collectively, a profile (Ri)i∈N of preference orderings is single-peaked if there exists at least one 
geometric ordering Ω with respect to which every individual’s preference ordering Ri is single-
peaked. A geometric ordering Ω with this property is called a structuring dimension.  
Note the distinction between single-peakedness of an individual preference ordering and single-
peakedness of a profile. The former (absent ties) is trivially single-peaked with respect to some 
geometric ordering of the alternatives, for instance the one arraying them in the individual’s de-
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creasing order of preference itself (e.g., a preference for x over y over z is single-peaked with respect 
to [x y z]). Single-peakedness is non-vacuous at the individual level only with respect to a particular 
geometric ordering. A profile is single-peaked, on the other hand, if and only if every individual’s 
preference ordering is single-peaked with respect to the same geometric ordering. 
As discussed in more detail below, a geometric ordering Ω that renders one or several individu-
als’ preference orderings single-peaked may, but need not, represent an ordering of the alternatives 
on some semantic issue dimension, where, for example, “left” could be most liberal, most secular, 
or most environmentalist; “right” most conservative, most religious, or most anti-environmentalist.  
Single-peakedness is a sufficient condition for avoiding cycles and lends the majority-winning 
alternative a median interpretation, as previously described.7 For any single-peaked profile (Ri)i∈N, 
the majority preference ordering is transitive, and the median individual’s most preferred alternative 
(relative to a structuring dimension Ω) is a Condorcet winner (Black 1948, Arrow 1951/1963) (as-
suming n is odd).8 That majority voting on domains of single-peaked preferences (relative to some 
Ω) is a median voting scheme also protects it against strategic voting (Moulin 1980). 
 
Proximity to Single-Peakedness 
Single-peakedness is sufficient but not necessary for avoiding cycles. For example, the existence of 
a large enough subset of the individuals in N with single-peaked preferences may also be sufficient.9 
Consider the largest (or tied for largest) subset M of N such that the preference orderings of all indi-
viduals in M—those in the (sub-)profile (Ri)i∈M—are single-peaked with respect to some geometric 
ordering of the alternatives. Call such an ordering (it need not be unique) a largest structuring di-
mension. Define the proximity to single-peakedness of the profile (Ri)i∈N as S=m/n, where m is the 
size of M (Niemi 1969, List 2001). S equals 1 for full single-peakedness (M=N) and is typically 
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bounded below by a value greater than 0. If all individual preferences are strict, the lower bound is 
2(k-1)/k!, which equals 2/3 for k=3, 1/3 for k=4, 2/15 for k=5, and so on, in decreasing fashion.10  
By Black’s theorem, S=1 is sufficient for the existence of a Condorcet winner. But what about 
S<1? For any threshold α (0<α<1), we can determine the conditional probability—call it p—that 
there exists a Condorcet winner, given S>α (a deviation from an impartial culture).11 Analytical and 
computational results suggest that the higher the α, the higher the p (Niemi 1969, Feld and Grofman 
1986, Gehrlein 2004). To illustrate, we have randomly generated 1,000,000 profiles of preference 
orderings over k=3 alternatives for various n. An online Appendix reports the relative frequencies 
(estimating the probabilities) of the existence of a Condorcet winner for given ranges of S for 
n=101.12 We find that the higher the proximity to single-peakedness, the higher the probability. 
 
DELIBERATION AND SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS 
Deliberation has been variously defined (see, e.g., Cohen 1989, Dryzek 1990, 2000, Fishkin 1991, 
Knight and Johnson 1994, Gutman and Thompson 1996, Bohman and Rehg 1997, Elster 1998). For 
present purposes, we define it moderately thinly, as discussion that is substantive, balanced, and 
civil (see also Fishkin and Luskin 2005).13 It focuses on the policy or electoral alternatives and the 
reasons for preferring some over others; involves the airing of a broad range of perspectives, argu-
ments, and positions; and takes place in an atmosphere of mutual respect. So defined, deliberation 
can be expected to have a variety of beneficial effects. Most relevantly for present purposes, it can 
be expected to induce learning and thinking and thus to produce more considered preferences (for 
evidence, see, e.g., Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002, Luskin and Fishkin 2002, Barabas 2004). 
Our focal claim is that deliberation shapes preferences in ways that robustly protect against ma-
jority cycles. One common but naïve hypothesis is that it does so by creating perfect substantive 
agreement. Elster (1986, p. 112) describes this line of thought as follows:  
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“Rather than aggregating or filtering preferences, the political system should be set up with a 
view to changing them by public debate and confrontation. The input to the social choice 
mechanism would then not be the raw, quite possibly selfish or irrational, preferences …, but in-
formed and other-regarding preferences … There would [then] not be any need for an aggrega-
tion mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences.”  
Unanimity, in populations of any size, is unattainable. A more realistic claim would be that delib-
eration increases substantive agreement. Past Deliberative Polls cast doubt on even this more mod-
est claim (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002), but in any case substantive agreement is unnecessary 
for avoiding majority cycles. As already noted, single-peakedness, which does not require substan-
tive agreement, precludes cycles, and proximity to single-peakedness already makes them less 
probable. Deliberation, in turn, can be expected to increase proximity to single-peakedness (Miller 
1992, Knight and Johnson 1994, Dryzek and List 2003). It may do so in either of two broad ways:  
 
Single-Peakedness through Meta-Agreement 
Deliberation may increase proximity to single-peakedness by increasing meta-agreement (List 2002), 
that is, agreement on a common semantic issue dimension (like liberal/conservative or secular 
/religious) in terms of which to conceptualize the choice at hand, as distinct from substantive agree-
ment on what choice to make. This involves a three-step process. The first step is for the participants 
to focus on a common semantic issue dimension. The second is for them to place the alternatives in 
the same left-right order on it (thereby relating a geometric ordering like [x y z] to the semantic issue 
dimension).14 The third step is for each individual to identify a most preferred alternative and to 
adopt a decreasing preference for other alternatives as they get more distant in either direction from 
it relative to that common left-right ordering. This process may but need not be conscious.   
The process may occur through discussion, with individuals influencing one another. As the par-
ticipants talk, learn, and think about the alternatives, they consider the reasons for or against them, out 
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of which a semantic issue dimension can be constructed. In deliberating about energy choices, for 
example, the participants may come to realize that some alternatives are cheap but dirty, others clean 
but expensive. To the extent that they focus on these attributes in evaluating the alternatives, they will 
have constructed a semantic issue dimension defined by the trade-off between cost and the envi-
ronment. That is the first step. As the participants learn more about the attributes of specific alterna-
tives, moreover, they can see how to place them in some geometric order corresponding to the se-
mantic dimension they have constructed. They learn, for example, that coal is cheap but dirty, natural 
gas cleaner but more expensive, and wind power still cleaner but still more expensive. That is the 
second step. Then, as each participant considers the semantic issue dimension, the geometric place-
ment of the alternatives on it, and his or her weighing of the underlying reasons, he or she may arrive 
at a most preferred alternative and rank other alternatives according to their distance in either direc-
tion from it. Someone who favors environmental over cost considerations may come to support wind 
power as a first choice, followed by natural gas and coal (assuming there are no other alternatives). 
That is the third step. The same three-step process can also occur through excogitation, any discus-
sion aside, with individuals independently arriving at a similar conceptualization of the alternatives.  
The semantic issue dimension and geometric ordering in this process may be more or less natu-
ral, in the sense that the reasons out of which the issue dimension is constructed may be more or 
less salient for the relevant population, and the geometric placement of the alternatives on it more or 
less obvious. The salience of given reasons and the obviousness of given placements, of course, will 
depend on the population in question. The three-step process we have described does not require the 
existence of any particularly natural issue dimension. All it requires is that some reasons become 
sufficiently focal to allow the construction of a common issue dimension. The resulting approach to 
single-peakedness, however, can be expected to be more pronounced to the extent that there is a 
natural issue dimension and geometric placement of the alternatives on it. 
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Single-Peakedness without Meta-Agreement 
Deliberation can also increase proximity to single-peakedness without increasing meta-agreement. 
A profile’s single-peakedness is a matter of the aggregate coherence or patterning of preferences 
across individuals, not necessarily the cognitive organization of each individual’s preference order-
ing. Individuals may simply adopt preference orderings they come to recognize as typical of politi-
cal elites with whom they identify, and to the extent that elite preference profiles are close to single-
peaked (presumably due to meta-agreement at the elite level), the resulting public preference pro-
files will also be close to single-peaked. This second, cue-taking mechanism requires shallower 
learning and thought than the mechanism involved in meta-agreement. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
We expect deliberation’s effect on proximity to single-peakedness (S) to be nonlinear. Since S cannot 
exceed 1, while deliberation is presumably unbounded above, further increases from high-enough lev-
els of deliberation should bring only small increases in the (correspondingly high) value of S. Thus we 
expect S to be an increasing, strictly concave function of deliberation, approaching 1 as deliberation in-
creases. A testable implication is that deliberation’s effect should vary with the salience of the issue. 
For highly salient issues, which have usually already received a good deal of casual deliberation in 
the participants’ everyday environments, preference profiles should already be relatively close to sin-
gle-peaked, and the effect of the more formal onsite deliberation should be small. It is for issues of 
low to moderate salience that we expect the onsite deliberation to make an appreciable difference.  
As noted above, the effect should be greater to the extent that there is a natural issue dimension 
and geometric ordering of the alternatives for the participants to adopt (whatever they may have 
started with). The effect should also be mediated by the learning and thought deliberation induces. 
The greater the learning and thought, the greater the expected increase in proximity to single-
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peakedness. This hypothesis is normatively important. It suggests that deliberation’s effect stems at 
least partly from meta-agreement produced by learning and thought, not just from cue-taking. 
To sum up, then, our principal hypotheses are: 
H1: Deliberation tends to increase proximity to single-peakedness, subject to the constraints in  
H2, H3, and H4. 
H2: The rate of increase diminishes, eventually becoming negligible, at high enough levels of 
deliberation. 
H3: The increase is greatest among those deliberating most “effectively,” in the sense of learn-
ing and thinking the most.  
H4: The increase is greater, ceteris paribus, to the extent that there is a natural issue dimension 
and geometric ordering of the alternatives. 
We cannot test H2 directly, but a testable corollary is:  
H2′: Deliberation’s effect is smaller for higher- than for lower-salience issues.  
It should also be noted that while we have no quantitative measure of the naturalness of issue di-
mensions or geometric orderings of the alternatives, some of the issue dimensions and orderings we 
encounter below do seem distinctly more natural than others, affording at least a rough test of H4. 
 
EMPIRICAL CASES  
We have already described the basic design of Deliberative Polls (“DPs”). Members of a random sam-
ple are interviewed, then invited to attend a weekend discussing the issues at a common site. Between 
the first interview and the weekend, they are sent carefully balanced briefing materials laying out ar-
guments for and against policy alternatives. During the weekend, they alternate between discussions 
in randomly assigned small groups and plenary sessions in which they put questions generated by the 
small-group discussions to panels of experts or policy makers. The discussions are led by moderators 
trained to intervene as little and as neutrally as possible, steering the participants neither toward nor 
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away from particular alternatives, and neither toward nor away from consensus. They also try to en-
sure that no-one dominates, that everyone participates, and that all sides are considered. At the end, the 
participants answer the same questions as at the beginning. Some DPs also involve control groups.  
The “treatment” is thus broadly deliberative, revolving around discussions—in the small groups; 
in the corridors and over meals, coffees, and drinks; in the dialogues with the plenary session panel-
ists; and in casual exchanges with family, friends, and co-workers in the interval between the initial 
interview and the onsite proceedings. The discussions also entail and occasion much thinking and 
learning (as documented, at least with respect to learning, below). 
 
Data and Alternatives 
Our data come from nine DPs, eliciting preference orderings over three or more alternatives on a 
total of thirteen issues.15 The DPs, issues, and alternatives (numbered as in ensuing analyses) are: 
• Six regional DPs commissioned by Texas electric utility companies (SWEPCO, CPL, WTU, En-
tergy, HL&P, SPS) sought orderings of four policies for meeting electricity needs: (1) conserva-
tion, (2) building new fossil fuel facilities, (3) building new wind or solar facilities, (4) buying 
electricity from elsewhere (SWEPCO, CPL); or (1) building new coal facilities, (2) building 
new wind or solar facilities, (3) conservation, (4) building new natural gas facilities (WTU); or 
(1) generating electricity using renewable technologies, (2) conservation, (3) building new fossil 
fuel facilities, (4) buying electricity from elsewhere (Entergy, HL&P, SPS). 
• Three of these DPs (SWEPCO, CPL, WTU) also sought orderings of four or five broader goals: 
(1) minimizing cost; (2) maintaining environmental quality; (3) ensuring adequate present and 
future supply (WTU) / avoiding dependence on any one resource (SWEPCO) / creating jobs 
(CPL); (4) ensuring that everyone’s basic electricity needs are met (WTU) / using renewable re-
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sources (SWEPCO, CPL); and (5) minimizing outages (WTU) / maximizing flexibility to in-
crease or reduce production quickly (SWEPCO). 
• The Australian national DP on the 1999 referendum on making Australia a republic (Luskin et 
al. 2000) sought orderings of three constitutional possibilities for the Australian head of state: 
(1) a republic with a directly elected president, (2) a republic with a parliamentarily appointed 
president (the referendum proposal), and (3) the status quo, with the Queen as head of state. 
• The 1996 British national DP on the future of the Monarchy sought orderings of three possible 
changes to the British monarchy: (1) a monarchy with a more ordinary royal family, (2) a repub-
lic with a head of state with the same duties as the Queen, and (3) a republic with a head of state 
with the combined duties of Queen and Prime Minister. 
• The 2002 regional New Haven DP (Farrar et al. 2010) sought orderings of three possible poli-
cies for the level of commercial passenger service at the New Haven regional airport: (1) main-
taining it as is; (2) expanding it, offering more flights to more places; and (3) ending it. 
• The New Haven DP also sought orderings of four possible arrangements for sharing property-
tax revenues across the towns of greater New Haven: (1) full local control, (2) voluntary agree-
ments between towns, (3) state-provided incentives to share, and (4) state requirements to share.  
 
Salience and Naturalness 
These issues differ both in salience (of the issue as a whole) and in the extent to which there is a 
natural geometric ordering of the alternatives. Consider first salience. Electric utility policies in 
Texas and revenue sharing in New Haven had received little public attention before the DP. The 
Monarchy in Britain, the airport in New Haven, and the Constitutional Referendum in Australia had 
received incomparably more. These latter three were highly salient. Since values and goals typically 
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receive some thought, the electric utility goals were presumably in between—more salient than the 
electric utility policies but less salient than the three high-salience issues.  
Now consider the extent to which there is a natural ordering of the alternatives. This is not 
something that can readily be measured, but our sense is that the fairly explicit phrasing of the al-
ternatives as matters of degree, rather than in merely categorical terms, gives the alternatives in each 
of the two New Haven cases a more natural ordering than those in any of the others. The airport al-
ternatives can be obviously ordered from no commercial passenger service to increased service, 
with the status quo in-between; the revenue-sharing alternatives from no revenue-sharing (local 
control) to mandatory revenue-sharing, with voluntary sharing and incentivized sharing in-between. 
Plausibly, the electric utility policy alternatives can be ordered on some environmental-to-economic 
benefits dimension. By contrast, the electric utility goals—explicitly including not only minimizing 
cost and maintaining environmental quality but such other alternatives as diversifying the energy 
resource portfolio, avoiding outages, meeting everyone’s basic electricity needs, creating jobs, and 
being able to cope with short-term spikes or plummets in demand—seem less naturally orderable on 
any one dimension. The same is true of the alternatives in the Australian and British cases, each in-
cluding two very different departures from the status quo. To be sure, these assessments are rough 
and relative. The alternatives for the two New Haven cases can also be ordered on dimensions other 
than the level of commercial passenger service or the compulsoriness of revenue-sharing, and there 
could be circumstances in which other cases admit a more natural ordering, for instance, in Austra-
lia, in terms of the degree to which citizens can participate directly in choosing the head of state.  
 
ANALYSIS 
Table 1 describes the preferences on these issues before and after deliberation. The first seven rows 
contain the low-salience cases (electric utility policies in Texas and revenue sharing in New Haven), 
the next three contain the moderate-salience cases (electric utility goals in Texas), and the last three 
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contain the high-salience cases (the Australian referendum, the British monarchy, and the New Ha-
ven airport). The columns give the number of individuals in the sample (n), the number of alterna-
tives (k), the largest structuring dimension (D), the Condorcet winner (C), and the proximity to sin-
gle-peakedness (S) at both T1 (before deliberation) and T2 (after deliberation).16 The subscripts “1” 
and “2” distinguish the T1 and T2 values. A final column gives the change in proximity to single-
peakedness from T1 to T2 (S2 – S1).  
Statistical inference in this context (to what we should see if the whole population received the 
DP treatment) is difficult. The definition of S, the proportion of individuals with single-peaked pref-
erences on the largest structuring dimension, depends on the identity of that dimension. Thus nei-
ther S1 nor S2 has a known sampling distribution. As a rough guide, however, we may estimate the 
standard errors conditional on the obtained structuring dimensions. The difference S2–S1 presents an 
additional difficulty, since the obtained structuring dimension may change from T1 to T2. For S2–
S1, therefore, we present worst-case estimates of the standard errors, on the assumption of zero co-
variance between S1 and S2.17 Table 1 presents these estimated standard errors in parentheses.      
(Table 1 about here) 
Consistent with earlier results on non-ranking attitudinal and choice variables (in, e.g., Luskin, 
Fishkin, and Jowell 2002, Fishkin and Luskin 1999, and Luskin, Fishkin, and Hahn 2007), delibera-
tion seems to induce considerable preference change. The Condorcet winner changes in eight of the 
thirteen cases, as does the largest structuring dimension (in not quite the same eight).18 But our con-
cern here is with proximity to single-peakedness, reported in the rightmost three columns.  
 
Proximity to Single-Peakedness 
A first point is that the proximity to single-peakedness at T1 is largely consistent with our sorting of 
the issues by salience. The mean S1 is 0.751 among the three high-salience cases, but only 0.486 
among the seven low-salience cases. True, it is still lower, at 0.308, among the three moderate-
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salience cases (all electric utility goals), but two of these have more alternatives and thus a lower 
minimum S. In addition, the electric utility goals arguably afford less of a natural left-right ordering 
of the alternatives than the electric utility policies, not to mention New Haven revenue-sharing. 
But could the high-salience cases have the highest mean S1 simply because they have only k=3 
alternatives? Recall that S’s lower bound, given strict preferences, is highest for k=3.19 A rough way 
of addressing this possibility is to calculate how far S exceeds its minimum as a fraction of how far 
it could do so. Call this adjusted index S′ = (S–Smin)/(1–Smin), where Smin is the lower bound. S′ 
ranges from 0 (when S=Smin) to 1 (when S=1). The adjustment is only rough because the formula for 
Smin assumes strict preferences. As many respondents are indifferent between given pairs of alterna-
tives, S is occasionally lower than Smin. For what it is worth, however, this adjustment leaves the 
three high-salience cases displaying the highest T1 proximity to single-peakedness. The mean S1′ is 
0.268, 0.138, and 0.229 for the low-, medium-, and high-salience cases.20  
More importantly, Table 1 supports H1, H2′, and H4. (We consider H3 below.) Regarding H1, 
the mean increase across all thirteen rows is 0.101. If normally distributed, the observed S2 – S1 
would be statistically significant by conventional standards (by a two-tailed test at the 0.05 level 
against the null-hypothesis value of 0) for nine of the thirteen cases.  
Regarding H2′, the increase is confined to the ten low- and moderate-salience cases, for which 
the mean increase is 0.134. The mean increase is also larger for the low-salience cases (0.141) than 
for the moderate-salience cases (0.116). For the three high-salience cases, the mean increase is  
-0.006. Two of the latter actually show decreases. Again, the observed S2–S1, if normally distributed, 
would be statistically significant for every low- to moderate-salience issue except electric utility 
policies in the Entergy DP and statistically insignificant for all three high-salience issues. Here too, 
this pattern could be an artefact of differences in the number of alternatives. In the low-salience 
cases, coincidentally involving more alternatives, S could simply have more room to increase. But 
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S′ shows mean increases of -0.014 for the high-salience cases,21 0.149 for the moderate-salience 
cases, and 0.212 for the low-salience cases—still consistent with H2′. So at least on issues that are 
not extremely salient, deliberation does seem to increase proximity to single-peakedness. 
Regarding H4, the increase is greatest, among both low-to-medium and high-salience cases, for 
the one case in each set that has a relatively natural left-right ordering of the alternatives (the New 
Haven revenue-sharing and airport cases, respectively). It is worth noting, however, that at least for 
low-to-moderate salience cases the presence of a relatively natural ordering of the alternatives is not 
necessary for a major increase in proximity to single-peakedness. Seven of the other eight low-to-
moderate salience cases also show an appreciable increase. This supports our earlier claim that 
shared issue dimensions can be constructed (when there is no relatively natural ordering of the al-
ternatives), as well as discovered (when there is). 
 
Proximity to Single-Peakedness and Substantive Agreement 
Perfect substantive agreement (unanimity) implies single-peakedness, and high substantive agree-
ment may be expected to produce high proximity to single-peakedness. Could the story of our re-
sults be simply that deliberation is producing increased substantive agreement, with increased prox-
imity to single-peakedness as a byproduct? That is what Shapiro (2005), for instance, would sup-
pose. But proximity to single-peakedness, as noted, need not rest on substantive agreement.  
To examine this question, we adopt the inverse of the Laakso-Taagepera index of fragmentation 
(Laakso and Taagepera 1979, Taagepera and Grofman 1981) as a simple measure of substantive 
agreement. We focus on each individual’s most preferred alternative. Writing nj for the number of 
individuals most preferring the jth alternative (where j = 1, 2, …, k), the index of substantive agree-
ment is A = (n1/n)2 + (n2/n)2 + … + (nk/n)2. A = 1 when all individuals have the same most preferred 
alternative (perfect substantive agreement), and A = 1/k when equal numbers of individuals most 
prefer each of the k alternatives (maximum substantive disagreement). 
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(Table 2 about here) 
Table 2A reports the raw frequencies (n1, n2, …, nk) of the most preferred alternatives, the index 
of substantive agreement, A1 and A2, at T1 and T2, and the change A2 – A1. It is clear from these re-
sults that the observed increases in proximity to single-peakedness are not just a by-product of in-
creased substantive agreement. Indeed, substantive agreement does not generally increase. It in-
creases in only four of the thirteen cases, and the average “increase” (actually a decrease) is  
-0.046.22 Furthermore, the changes in substantive agreement are only modestly—and negatively—
associated with the changes in proximity to single-peakedness. The Pearsonian correlation between 
the two across the thirteen cases is -0.308. At least on these particular issues, increased proximity to 
single-peakedness tends to be associated with decreased substantive agreement; the more those de-
liberating come to disagree, the more they come to agree about what they are disagreeing about.  
 
Learning and Thinking 
So far, we have established support for H1, H2′, and H4. But the “how” of deliberation’s effect is 
important. The participants could simply have been taking cues, adopting ready-made preference 
orderings held by political elites. If that were all they did (as suggested by Aldred 2004), the delib-
eration behind the increased proximity to single-peakedness would have been quite shallow. 
This leads us to consider the mediating effect of learning and thinking about the issues. By 
“learning” we mean the T1-T2 increase in relevant knowledge—knowledge not just of facts but of 
arguments for and against the alternatives and of other people’s circumstances, beliefs, goals, and 
capacities, among other things. Of course, knowledge in all this variety is difficult to measure. So is 
“thinking.” Operationally, therefore, we focus on factual knowledge, which is more readily measur-
able (as the proportion of factual questions answered correctly), is important in its own right, and 
can serve as a proxy for other sorts of knowledge and thought. Knowledge is positively correlated 
with the cognitive organization resulting from thought (Neuman 1981, Luskin 1987, Price 1999); 
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knowledge of any one topic in a given domain is positively correlated with knowledge of other top-
ics in the same domain (if for no other reason than that they are all affected by cognitive ability, 
controlling for interest; see, e.g., Brody 1997); and different sorts of knowledge are positively corre-
lated (as in, e.g., Schneider, Rittle-Johnson, and Star 2011).23  
For ten of our thirteen cases (all but the three based on the Entergy, HL&P, and SPS DPs), the 
questionnaires afford enough factual knowledge items to construct a usable index. Both New Haven 
indices include four general New Haven items, plus two specific to the topic (the airport or revenue 
sharing). The Australian referendum index includes four general Australian politics items, plus 
eight specific to the referendum. The SWEPCO index is confined to the five knowledge items 
shared with the CPL and WTU questionnaires. The indices range from 0 (no items answered cor-
rectly) to 1 (all answered correctly). The online Appendix describes the ingredients. 
Table 2B reports the mean T1 and T2 knowledge and mean T1-T2 knowledge gains. The table 
contains only seven rows because three of the electric utility DPs provide six of our original cases. 
The first three rows (CPL, WTU, SWEPCO) are a mix of low-salience (for policies) and moderate-
salience (for goals), the fourth (New Haven revenue sharing) is low-salience, and the last three (the 
New Haven airport, the Australian referendum, and the British Monarchy) are high-salience. In 
every case, the participants learned a great deal. The knowledge gains are a first indication that 
more is going on than mere cue-taking. The mean increase, across all rows, is a sizable 0.218, akin 
to the mean score on an exam’s increasing by 22 points on the familiar 0 to 100 scale.  
Note that Table 2B lends further support to our characterizations of salience. While comparisons 
of different knowledge indices must be taken with some caution, resting as they do on an implicit 
assumption of equal average difficulty, the pattern is clear. The mean T1 knowledge is highest in the 
high-salience cases (averaging 0.524) and lowest in the low-salience case (0.362 for New Haven 
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revenue sharing). The mean knowledge gain is lowest in the high-salience cases (averaging “only” 
0.191) and highest in the low-salience case (0.245 for New Haven revenue sharing).  
The next step is to show that the previously observed increases in proximity to single-
peakedness are at least partly learning-driven. Since proximity to single-peakedness is intrinsically 
aggregate, our strategy is to partition the sample into low- and high-learning subsamples and then to 
perform the same analysis as above separately within each. In practice, this means dividing the 
sample by observed T2 knowledge, which can be shown, under a broad range of plausible condi-
tions, to be more highly correlated with actual knowledge gain than is observed knowledge gain (T2 
observed knowledge minus T1 observed knowledge).24 Participants who emerge knowing a lot at 
T2 have typically learned a lot—either observably, if they scored low on knowledge at T1, or unob-
servably, if they scored high on knowledge at T1 and thus could show little gain. The threshold di-
viding “high” from “low” knowledge is always drawn so as to divide the sample as equally as pos-
sible.25 Table 2B gives the details. We expect the gain in proximity to single-peakedness to be 
greater in the high T2 knowledge subsample, in accordance with H3. The results, in Table 3A, sup-
port this hypothesis in spades. Even in the low T2 knowledge subsample, proximity to single-
peakedness generally increased. In the high T2 knowledge subsample, it always increased. In every 
case, moreover, the increase is greater for the high T2 knowledge subsample than for the low T2 
knowledge subsample. The mean increase is 0.147 for the former, but only 0.052 for the latter.26 
(Table 3 about here) 
Here, too, salience is an important conditioning factor. For the high T2 knowledge subsample, 
the mean increase is 0.209 in the low-salience cases (electric utility policies and New Haven reve-
nue sharing), 0.130 in the moderate-salience cases (electric utility goals), and 0.081 in the high-
salience cases (the New Haven airport, the Australian referendum, and the British Monarchy). For 
the low T2 knowledge subsample, the mean increases are similarly consistent with the sorting by 
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salience: 0.133 in the low-salience cases, 0.103 in the moderate-salience cases, and -0.106 (not 
merely smaller but negative, a decrease) in the high-salience cases.  
This breakdown sheds further light on the failure of overall proximity to single-peakedness to 
increase in the three high-salience cases. It does increase for the high T2 knowledge participants 
(those who emerge knowing relatively much). There is no overall increase because it decreases for 
the low T2 knowledge participants (those who emerge knowing relatively little). We are unsure of 
the reason in the British monarchy case, but in the other two high-salience cases, a major reason 
seems to be that, at least for the low T2 knowledge participants, the largest structuring dimension 
changes, as Table 3B shows. Recall that S registers only the proportion whose preferences are sin-
gle-peaked with respect to the largest structuring dimension. If many low T2 knowledge partici-
pants continue to hold preferences that are single-peaked with respect to the old largest structuring 
dimension, the T2 proportion whose preferences are single-peaked with respect to the new one can 
easily be lower than the T1 proportion whose preferences were single-peaked with respect to the old 
one—in which event S2 will be lower than S1. This is in fact exactly what happened in the cases of 
the New Haven airport and the Australian referendum (as detailed in the online Appendix). 
 
DISCUSSION 
We have argued that deliberation increases proximity to single-peakedness—at least on low- to 
moderate-salience issues, where there has not been too much prior deliberation and where proximity 
to single-peakedness is not already high. We have also argued that deliberation’s effect should be 
greatest among those who are learning and thinking the most, suggesting that it is not just a matter 
of thoughtless cue-taking. Our analysis, based on Deliberative Polling data, supports these claims. 
Controlling for salience, the increases in proximity to single-peakedness are greatest for the is-
sues that have a relatively natural left-right ordering of the alternatives. Where there is a relatively 
natural ordering, deliberation appears to help people see that. But the increases are appreciable even 
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for the issues that do not have one. In those cases, deliberation appears to help people construct a 
shared ordering. 
Our analyses bear some third-cousin-ish relationship to those based on factor-analytic and co-
variance-structure models of responses to non-ranking policy attitude items (as, e.g., in Judd and 
Milburn 1980, Jackson 1983, Peffley and Hurwitz 1993). The dimensionality and fit do not directly 
reflect attitude organization inside the minds of individual respondents (Luskin 1987, 2002) but do 
register the degree of aggregate patterning of opinion. The fewer the dimensions and the better the 
fit, the greater the patterning. Stratifying these analyses by variables like knowledge generally pro-
duces results akin to ours: the number of dimensions decreases and the fit increases as knowledge 
increases (Stimson 1975, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). That said, the specific form of patterning 
we examine here—the proximity to single-peakedness of preference profiles—is distinctive, not 
only in conceptual detail but in social-choice-theoretic significance. 
A skeptic may wonder how much of the increase in proximity to single-peakedness is due to the 
actual deliberation (and consequent thought and learning) between the initial interview and the post-
event questionnaire. But an experiment enfolded in the New Haven DP provides reassurance on this 
score. Half the participants discussed the airport first and revenue sharing second, and the other half 
the reverse. The results (recounted more fully in Farrar et al. 2010, in this respect a follow-up to this 
paper) suggest that the great bulk of the increase in proximity to single-peakedness stemmed from 
the onsite deliberation (consisting of both small-group and plenary discussions), rather than from 
anything between the first interview and the onsite deliberation. On the airport, an extremely salient 
issue, there is little increase in S to apportion, but on revenue sharing, the increase in each treatment 
group occurs largely or entirely during the interval bracketing the group’s discussion of revenue 
sharing (earlier in the one, later in the other). 
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Still, the full story is doubtless more complex than the one told here. The issue’s salience and 
the individuals’ learning are probably not the only conditioning or mediating factors. Much may 
also depend, for example, on the broader quality of the deliberation. The more focused, serious, and 
reflective the deliberation, the more it should promote proximity to single-peakedness. As the num-
ber of DPs with suitable ranking questions increases, we hope to examine these and other hypotheses. 
There also remains, as ever, some causal mediation to explore. This is not just a question of the 
extent to which the movement toward single-peakedness is attributable to the deliberation in the DP 
treatment (as discussed in Farrar et al. 2010), but of what it is about deliberation that is responsible. 
Two sorts of disaggregation are of interest: the first to apportion deliberation’s effect as between 
various possible intervening social and psychological mechanisms, the second to apportion its effect 
as between the various components of the DP treatment. To what extent, for example, is it thinking 
versus learning that increases proximity to single-peakedness? To what extent is it the small-group 
discussions versus the plenary sessions with experts and policy makers? The argument above sug-
gests some possible answers, as do the results regarding knowledge, whose effect may be mediating 
as well as conditioning. Closer examination must await future studies, with finer measurement or 
experimental manipulation aimed at disaggregation of either sort. But for now it is an important ad-
vance to show, as we have done here, that there is an effect to be parsed—that, at least under widely 
prevalent conditions, deliberation does move preferences closer to single-peakedness.  
This implies that deliberation can robustly protect against majority cycles, in the sense explained 
above, by moving preferences toward single-peakedness. Ironically, it was Riker (1982, p. 128) who 
first raised this possibility, writing that “[i]f, by reason of discussion, debate, civic education, and 
political socialization, voters have a common view of the political dimension (as evidenced by sin-
gle-peakedness), then a transitive outcome is guaranteed.” He immediately added, lest too much 
hope be drawn from this remark, that he expected this only for “issues of minor importance”. 
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Here we see that deliberation has the posited effect only on issues of low to moderate salience. 
But salience and importance are hardly the same. Many issues are important, but only a few, at any 
moment, are salient. Salient issues, moreover, need not be important. It is not unknown for rela-
tively frivolous issues to be salient. Thus the domain of deliberation’s effect on proximity to single-
peakedness is broad. And when unattended but important issues become more salient, the “discus-
sion, debate, civic education, and political socialization”—in short, the deliberation—they then re-
ceive will move preferences toward single-peakedness, thus helping to ensure that “a transitive out-
come is guaranteed.” 
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Table 1: Before-After Results: Largest Structuring Dimension,  
Condorcet Winner, and Proximity to Single-Peakedness  
 
Issue DP N K D1 D2 C1 C2 S1 S2 S2 – S1 
SWEPCO 232 4 [2314] [2314] 3 1 0.405 (0.032) 0.556 (0.033) 0.151 (0.046) 
CPL 216 4 [2314] [3124] 3 1 0.389 (0.033) 0.519 (0.034) 0.130 (0.047) 
WTU 230 4 [2314] [2134] 3 3 0.374 (0.032) 0.496 (0.033) 0.122 (0.046) 
Entergy 175 4 [3124] [3214] 1 2 0.640 (0.036) 0.691 (0.035) 0.051 (0.050) 




SPS 222 4 [3214] [1234] 2 2 0.559 (0.033) 0.649 (0.032) 0.090 (0.046) 
Revenue Sharing New Haven 132 4 [1234] [1234] 3 2 0.515 (0.043) 0.803 (0.035) 0.288 (0.056) 
SWEPCO 232 5 [21435] [12345] 4 3 0.237 (0.028) 0.362 (0.032) 0.125 (0.042) 
CPL 216 4 [1423] [3124] 4 2 0.444 (0.034) 0.579 (0.034) 0.135 (0.048) 
Electric Utility 
Goals 
 WTU 230 5 [12435] [13425] 4 3 0.243 (0.028) 0.330 (0.031) 0.087 (0.042) 
Airport Expan-










Monarchy 258 3 [213] [213] 1 1 0.651 (0.030) 0.647 (0.030) 
-0.004 
(0.042) 
Note: n is the sample size; k the number of alternatives, numbered as in the text; D1 and D2 the largest structuring dimensions at 
T1 and T2; C1 and C2 the Condorcet winners at T1 and T2; and S1 and S2 the proximity to single-peakedness at T1 and T2. The 
parenthetical entries in the S1 and S2 columns are estimated standard errors.  
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Table 2: Before-After Substantive Agreement and Knowledge 
A. Substantive Agreement 
n1, …, nk  Issue DP 
T1 T2 
A1 A2 A2 – A1 
SWEPCO 25, 16, 103, 5 115, 29, 65, 15 .519 .369 -0.150 
CPL 16, 16, 99, 15 96, 61, 32, 17 .494 .336 -0.158 
WTU 11, 18, 112, 15 69, 37, 79, 40 .543 .276 -0.267 
Entergy 99, 29, 18, 13 65, 88, 16, 4 .440 .409 -0.031 
HL&P 110, 30, 21, 13 112, 39, 33, 5 .450 .425 -0.025 
Electric Utility 
Policies 
SPS 40, 107, 52, 16 31, 107, 63, 14 .346 .359 .013 
Revenue 
Sharing New Haven 43, 14, 48, 15 23, 51, 44, 12 .318 .308 -0.010 
SWEPCO 53, 31, 34, 83, 22 45, 37, 104, 37, 9 .247 .291 .044 
CPL 45, 29, 41, 94 63, 73, 19, 58 .306 .287 -0.019 
Electric Utility 
Goals 
WTU 59, 24, 34, 93, 11 46, 36, 76, 60, 11 .286 .246 -0.040 
Airport Ex-
pansion New Haven 33, 82, 4 30, 83, 13 .553 .501 -0.052 
Australian 
Head of State 
Australian 





Monarchy 136, 41, 33 128, 46, 24 .482 .487 .005 
Note: n1, …, nk (at T1 and T2) are the numbers of respondents with first preferences for alternatives 
1, …, k, numbered as in the text; and A1 and A2 the index of substantive agreement at T1 and T2.  
 
B. Knowledge 
Issue DP # Items K1 K2 K2 – K1 
Threshold 





SWEPCO 5 .435 .638 .203*** ≥ 0.80 122 110 
CPL 5 .360 .580 .219*** ≥ 0.80 144 72 
Electric  
Utility  




Haven 6 .362 .607 .245
***




Haven 6 .407 .588 .182
***
 ≥ 0.66 61 71 
Australian 









Monarchy 9 .646 .794 .148
***
 ≥ 0.88 122 136 
Note: #Items is the number of questions in the knowledge index; K1 and K2 the mean knowledge at 
T1 and T2; Threshold for “High K2” the dividing line between high and low T2 knowledge; and 
Low-K2 and High-K2 n the numbers of “high” and “low” T2 knowledge participants. *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Before-After Results Conditional on T2 Knowledge 
A. Single-peakedness 
  Low K2 High K2 S2 – S1 
Issue DP S1 S2 S1 S2 Low K2 High K2 
SWEPCO .393 .525 .418 .591 .132 .173 
CPL  .382 .479 .431 .597 .097 .166 
Electric Utility 
Policies 




.518 .714 .513 .868 .196 .355 
SWEPCO .246 .361 .236 .364 .115 .128 
CPL  .410 .535 .514 .667 .125 .153 
Electric Utility 
Goals 




.787 .754 .789 .859 -0.033 .070 
Australian 
Head of State 
Australian 





Monarchy .582 .475 .713 .802 -0.107 .089 
Note: Low-K2 S1 and S2 are the proximity to single-peakedness at T1 and T2 for the low T2 knowl-
edge subsample; High-K2 S1 and S2 the proximity to single-peakedness at T1 and T2 for the high T2 
knowledge subsample. 
  
B. Largest Structuring Dimension in the High-Salience Cases  
  Low K2 High K2 
Issue DP D1 D2 D1 D2 
Airport Expansion New Haven [1 2 3] [2 1 3] [2 1 3] [2 1 3] 
Australian Head of State Australian 
Referendum 
[2 1 3] [1 2 3] [2 1 3] [1 2 3] 




[2 1 3] [2 1 3] [2 1 3] [2 1 3] 
Note: Low-K2 D1 and D2 are the largest structuring dimension at T1 and T2 for the low T2 knowl-
edge subsample; High-K2 D1 and D2 the largest structuring dimension at T1 and T2 for the high T2 
knowledge subsample. The alternatives are numbered as in the text. 
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pleted], and the data and instructions necessary to reproduce the numerical results will be made 
available at http://cdd.stanford.edu. 
1
 No ‘universal,’ ‘Paretian,’ ‘non-dictatorial,’ and ‘pairwise independent’ aggregation rule guarantees 
rational collective preferences. Although more controversial than the other desiderata, independence 
precludes agenda manipulation (Riker 1982) and strategic voting (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975). 
Other generalizations of Condorcet’s paradox include McKelvey (1979) and Schofield (1976). 
2
 Although cycling may also arguably have some benefits (McGann 2006, building on Miller 1983). 
3
 Other conditions include value restriction (Sen 1966) and some necessary and sufficient condi-
tions (e.g., Miller 2000, Elsholtz and List 2005, Regenwetter et al. 2006). Since these are less de-
manding than single-peakedness, the hypothesis that deliberation induces structure in individual 
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preferences is stronger and more interesting when formulated in terms of single-peakedness. On 
domain restrictions in social choice, see Gaertner (2001) and Dietrich and List (2010). 
4
 Single-peakedness lends majority voting a natural interpretation as a median voting scheme (Black 
1948, Arrow 1951/1963), and as famously shown by Moulin (1980), median voting schemes on 
domains of single-peaked preferences are strategy-proof, meaning that truthful expression of pref-
erences is a dominant strategy for every individual. Penn, Patty and Gailmard (2011) have recently 
challenged this claim, though their findings do not logically contradict the classic result, since the 
opportunities for manipulation they identify involve departures from the single-peaked domain. 
5
 The use of random samples of the mass public sets this study apart from most research on the oc-
currence of cycles, which typically examines narrower and more homogeneous groups like profes-
sional associations, clubs, or committees (for a critical overview, see Mackie 2004).  
6
 Formally, Ri is single-peaked with respect to Ω if, for any triple x,y,z∈X with y between x and z 
relative to Ω, it is not the case that xRiy and zRix (so there is no “cave” between x and z, at y). 
7
 Our ordinal definition of single-peakedness is the social-choice-theoretic one of Black (1948) and 
Arrow (1951/1963), not to be confused with the cardinal definition in spatial voting theory. There, 
preferences are a function of the alternatives’ Euclidean (or other) distances from an individual’s 
ideal point, which requires identifying alternatives with points in a Euclidean space, a restriction not 
made here. Spatial single-peakedness is sufficient for avoiding cycles only if the Euclidean space is 
one-dimensional, but then the condition is stronger than classical single-peakedness. 
8
 The median individual is the one with an equal number of others to the left and to the right, with 
individuals arrayed according to their most preferred alternatives relative to a structuring dimension.  
9
 Other sufficient conditions for the avoidance of cycles are mentioned in an earlier note. 
10
 The formula is stated without proof by Niemi (1969). A proof for k =3 is available on request. 
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11
 Taking an impartial culture as a Bayesian prior, p is the probability we would obtain through 
Bayesian updating given that S > α. This probability coincides with the proportion of profiles for 
which there exists a Condorcet winner among all possible profiles satisfying S > α. 
12
 More extensive simulations, in collaboration with Susan Holmes, show similar results for k > 3.  
13
 These properties may also entail some other, non-definitional properties, including increasing the 
frequency of appeals to the common good, for reasons sketched by Mill, Rawls, and others.  
14
 They need not arrive at the same preference ordering, nor agree on the most preferred alternative.  
15
 Respondents ranked their top k-1 choices, from which their bottom choice could be inferred. 
16
 There need not generally be a Condorcet winner, but in all these cases there happens to be one.  
17
 This is very conservative. As always, V(S2–S1)=V(S2)+V(S1)–2C(S2, S1), where V and C are vari-
ance and covariance, and C(S2, S1) should not actually be 0 but (highly) positive, implying V(S2–S1) 
< V(S2)+V(S1). To see this, note that (a) S1 may be taken as proxying T1 salience and thus (casual) 
T1 deliberation, (b) issues with higher S1 should also tend to have higher S2 (on account of lower 
numbers of alternatives, residually higher salience, and/or more natural left-right orderings), and (c) 
since the DP can be expected to shrink initial differences in salience, differences in S1 should be as-
sociated with smaller differences in S2 (consistent with H2′). So, if S2=α0+α1S1+u and, equivalently, 
S2–S1=α0+(α1–1)S1+u (where u is a disturbance), 0<α1<1 and -1<α1–1<0. The results in Table 1 con-
firm all this: the OLS estimates of α0, α1, and α1–1 are 0.229, 0.747, and -0.253, and the correlation 
(covariance normed to the [-1, 1] interval) between S1 and S2 is 0.890.  
18
 The quasi-control groups in the Australian DP suggest that these observed changes can indeed be 
attributed to the deliberative treatment. In the treatment group, the Condorcet winner changes from 
a directly elected president (1) to a parliamentarily appointed one (2), and the structuring dimension 
changes from [2 1 3] to [1 2 3] (3 is the status quo). Among the original interviewees who did not 
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participate in the deliberation but were later reinterviewed (n=227), the Condorcet winner remains 
1, and the structuring dimension remains [2 1 3], just as it is among a fresh random sample 
(n=3439) questioned by the Australian national election study immediately after the referendum. 
19
 The lower bound for S is 2/15≈0.133 for k=5, 1/3≈0.333 for k=4, and 2/3≈0.667 for k=3. 
20
 The 0.268 figure counts the British monarchy issue, where S1 fell slightly short of Smin, as 0. If 
instead we count S1′ as -0.047, the 0.268 falls to 0.252, still the highest of these figures. 
21
 The figure is -0.018 if we do not cut S′ off at 0. 
22
 Similarly, the number of first preferences for the alternative drawing the most first preferences 
(the maximum among n1, n2, …, nk) increases in only six of the thirteen cases. 
23
 We write of “knowledge,” the aptest, in our view, of several related concepts, including “informa-
tion,” “sophistication,” and “expertise” (see Luskin 2002). 
24
 Three phenomena underlie this result: (1) learning (knowledge gain) is facilitated by, and thus an 
increasing function of, prior knowledge (e.g., Bransford and Johnson 1972, Recht and Leslie 1988, 
Hambrick 1993); (2) observed knowledge, defined as the proportion of the survey’s knowledge 
items answered correctly, is ceilinged at 1.0; (3) the knowledge items on any survey are far from a 
random draw from the universe of potential such items, including many that only experts, if anyone, 
would know (Converse 2000, Luskin, Helfer, and Sood 2011). The selection is biased toward easy 
items, lest the observed knowledge index have almost no real variance, departing from zero only via 
lucky guessing. Under assumptions formalizing these phenomena, (1) the correlation between true 
and observed knowledge gain can be negative; (2) the correlation between true knowledge gain and 
observed T2 knowledge is always positive; and (3) the former is less than the latter for most plausi-
ble configurations of parameters. For proofs, see Luskin, Helfer, and Sood (2011). In analyses relat-
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ing learning to other variables, observed T2 knowledge can therefore yield sharper results, although 
in the present case we get essentially the same results if we use observed knowledge gain. 
25
 This would be a bad idea at T1, as in ordinary surveys, where the distribution of knowledge is 
severely right-skewed, so that dichotomizing at or near the median would yield a “high knowledge” 
group containing many respondents not much more knowledgeable than the members of the “low 
knowledge” group. Here, after deliberation, it is reasonable.   
26
 Although T1 and T2 knowledge may be correlated—those high at T2 tend already to have been 
high, and thus to have been closer to single-peaked, at T1—the difference in proximity to single-
peakedness between the high and low knowledge subsamples grows from 0.026 at T1 to 0.121 at T2. 
